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I. INTRODUCTION
Growth projections for business conducted over the Internet are outstanding.'
By 2003, global e-commerce 2 sales are forecasted to reach $70 billion.3 This
growth is partially attributed to small businesses beginning to act like
multinationals4 by penetrating international markets, and partially because of
multinationals implementing their global strategies. These changes in business
strategy necessitate a change in the manner in which business is conducted.
Handshakes and ink signatures are steadily being replaced by the click of a
mouse or an electronic signature. With China's entry into the World Trade
Organization,7 businesses will seek to utilize these new methods to penetrate the
Chinese Internet market. As businesses take advantage of the new opportunities
within China, the forecasts for global e-commerce will rise."
Although China has enacted legislation addressing some aspects of e-
commerce transactions, it has not taken the same definitive steps regarding the
1. See Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) for a complete discussion on the Internet and its
origins.
2. The term 'e-commerce' means "the use of the Internet for business-to-business and business-to-
consumer transactions." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER TERMs 182 (8th ed. 2000)
[hereinafter WEBSTER'S].
3. See Robert M. Kossick, The Emerging Disharmony of Electronic Commerce Legislation in Latin
America, 9 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 387, 393 (2001) (forecasting the explosive growth of e-commerce,
particularly when professional services market themselves on the Internet); see also Robbie Downing & Ross
McKean, Digital Signatures: Addressing the Legal Issues, 3 No. 6 E-COMMERCE L. REP. 9 (stating that
business-to-business transactions in the United States will increase some twenty-fold when compared to figures
in 2000). In the United States alone, e-commerce between businesses is projected to grow to $6.3 trillion by
2005. See id.
4. A multinational corporation is an entity with "operations, subsidiaries, or investments in more than
two countries." Dictionary.com, Multinationals, at http://dictionary.com/search?q=multinationals&r-
2 (last
visited Feb. 11, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
5. See David Taylor & Felix A. Ortiz, Encryption-Hindering the Hackers, Some Technical and Legal
Issues, 611 PRAC. L. INST. 743, 745 (2000) (describing the "far-reaching ramifications" the Internet is having
on businesses and consumers). For example, businesses are becoming cognizant of the potential promotional
value and distribution channel provided by the Internet. Id.; see also Dan Gebler, U.S. E-Tailers Still Leery of
Global Markets (Aug. 16, 2000), available at http:lwww.economercetimes.comlperl/printer/40 4 3 / (copy on
file with The Transnational Lawyer) (reporting that those companies that do not have "a flexible approach to e-
globalization may not be competitive in the future").
6. See infra, Part II.A for a discussion of electronic signatures.
7. See CNN, China's Long March to WTO Entry (Dec. 10, 2001), available at htpp://www.cnn.com/
2001IWORLD/asiapcf/eastlO9/181china.wto.timeline/ (copy on file with The Transnational Law'er)
(documenting the significant developments "relating to China's 15 year-bid to join the [World Trade
Organization]"). China initially applied to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986.
See id. On October 18, 2000, the Clinton administration gave China "normal trade status with the U.S." Id. On
November 10, 2001, trade ministers approved China's entry to the World Trade Organization and by December
11, 2001, China became a "fully fledged member of the international trading system." Id.
8. See Paul D. McKenzie, Electronic Commerce Law-People's Republic of China, at http://www.
perkinscoie.com/resources/ecommlprc.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (noting that there is a large amount of interest in China's e-commerce market because of its potential
for growth).
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legal status of electronic signatures that many of its trading partners have taken.9
Legal uncertainty regarding the enforceability of contracts executed with
electronic signatures may result. For example, it is unclear whether a contract
with a typed name at the end of an e-mail message or a digital signature will have
the same binding effect as its ink counterpart.' ° Nevertheless, this area of
uncertainty has not been totally ignored. Parts of the Chinese financial industry
and the provincial areas have created an infrastructure to support certain
electronic signature transactions. In addition, the Chinese national government is
currently drafting specific e-commerce legislation."
This Comment focuses upon the measures China must consider before
enacting legislation on electronic signatures by comparing and contrasting the
steps the United States and the United Nations have already taken. Part II defines
the basic concepts behind electronic signatures. Part I highlights the legislative
approaches the United States and the United Nations have taken to facilitate e-
commerce. Part IV describes the steps China has taken regarding electronic
signatures. Part V suggests how China can best approach the issue of electronic
signatures and Part VI concludes that China must adopt a legislative scheme
regarding electronic signatures in order to maintain a presence in the global e-
commerce marketplace.
II. BASIC CONCEPTS IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
As businesses rush to take advantage of opportunities over the Internet, they
are beginning to use electronic signatures more often to execute agreements. The
electronic signature is replacing its ink counterpart and is being used both to
show the identity of the signer, as well as to signify assent to the terms of the
9. See Jiang-Yu Wang, The Internet and E-Commerce in China: Regulations, Judicial Views and
Government Policies, 18 COMPUTER & INTERNET L. 12, 20 (2001) (surveying various aspects e-commerce
legislation in China, including a discussion of domain registration and encryption regulation); see also People's
Daily Online, China's Exports Increase to Top 10 Trading Partners, at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn
/20008/16/print2000816_48360.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
(reporting that the United States is China's largest importer, followed by Hong Kong, Japan and the European
Union). The United States imported US$28.24 billion worth of goods from China and the European Union
imported US$21.33 billion worth of goods. See id.
10. See Wang, supra note 9, at 20; see also AMERICAN BAR ASSoCIATION, Digital Signature Guidelines
Tutorial, available at http:lwww.abanet.orglscitechlecliscldsg-tutoria.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2001)
[hereinafter Guideline Tutorial] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting that "[a] signature is not
part of the substance of a transaction, but rather of its representation or form"). In general, signatures serve as
evidence, ceremony, approval, and give a sense of finality to a transaction. See id. Moreover, the signature, at
common law, is required in certain transactions to enforce a contract in court. See id.
11. See Liu Pinxin, Overview of the High-Level Symposium on China E-commerce Law (Demonstrative
Law), at http://www.civillaw.com.cn/english/Discussions/Dl.asp (last visited Sept. 28, 2001) (copy on file with
The Transnational Lawyer) (highlighting the debate between Chinese lawmakers regarding e-commerce
policies); see also The First Draft of "E-Commerce Law"(Demonstration Law) Finished, ASIAPORT DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 23, 2001, available for a fee at http://library.northernlights.comFB20010823870 000015.html?
inid=eSOiOQoehkFyyAX4eA (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (reporting that China looked to
developed countries while drafting this law).
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agreement.'2 This section explores the various types of electronic signatures used
in e-commerce and other related basic concepts.
A. Electronic Signatures
The phrase "electronic signature" describes a range of techniques used to
electronically authenticate'3 a person's identity.'4 For example, a name typed at
the end of an e-mail message and an iris scan'5 are both considered forms of
electronic signatures. The latter, known as a biometric signature, is created
when muscle movements, such as eye movements or handwritten signatures, are
caught on "contact sensitive technologies," '7 and transposed to electronically
made documents.' For example, biometric signature technology records every
stroke made by a signer, including the speed with which it was written and the
side from which the letter "t" was crossed. '9 While biometric signatures are
designed for use at will, they do not immediately verify a person's identity.0 To
verify the authenticity of a biometric signature, it must be submitted for forensic
analysis.2' Only after forensic analysis can a biometric signature be confidently
12. See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031 (2002).
13. Authentication is defined as the "assent to or adoption of a writing as one's own." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 127 (7th ed. 1999).
14. See Jane Kaufman Winn, Couriers Without Luggage: Negotiable Instruments and Digital
Signatures, 49 S.C. L. REV. 739, 740 (1998); see also Daniel J. Greenwood & Ray A. Campbell, Electronic
Commerce Legislation: From Written on Paper and Signed in Ink to Electronic Records and Online
Authentication, 53 Bus. LAW. 307, 309 (1997) (noting that electronic signatures can be "magnetic stripe cards
with personal identification numbers (PINs), user names and passwords, public-key cryptography, writing
tablets with electronic pens and even smart cards that generate a unique access code every few seconds").
15. See Jonathon E. Stem, Business Law ... The Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 391, 396 (2001) (classing an iris scan as a form of biometric
authentication that captures an electronic sample of a certain "physiological characteristic"). "Biometric
technology can identify an individual through recognition of a fingerprint, signature [and] voice." Id. at 395-96.
16. See id. at 396; see also Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 14, at 309 (noting that more
sophisticated authentication technologies will be available as technology continues to advance).
17. See Marc Gaudreau, On the Distinction Betveen Biometric and Digital Signatures, at http:/lwww.
cic.com/enterprise/whitepapers/whitepaper5.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2001) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (noting that contact sensitive technologies range from personal digital assistants (PDAs)
to digitized tablets).
18. Id.
19. See Communications Intelligence Corporation, Understanding Electronic Signatures, at http://www.
cic.com/enterprise/whitepapers/whitepaperl.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2001) (copy on file with The
Transnational Laiiyer) (noting that the stroke dynamics captured by biometric signature are unique to each
individual person).
20. See California Secretary of State, Frequently Asked Questions about California's Digital Signature
Law and Regulations, available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/digsig/digsigfaq.htm [hereinafter California FAQs]
(last visited Oct. 1, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting that this technology allows for
"future verification of the signature"). This is in contrast to other digital signatures discussed herein, because
digital signatures are designed to provide instant verification. See id.
21. See Gaudreau, supra note 17 (noting that when the biometric signature needs to be verified, it must
go through a forensic analysis similar to that conducted on ink signatures and would entail "expert visual and
microscopic examination"). Since biometric technology captures "speed, acceleration, deceleration, and the
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attached to a signer.22
A "digital signature" is another form of electronic signature. Unlike a
biometric signature, a digital signature bears no relation to handwritten
signatures.2 Digital Signature is a term of art referring to an electronic signature
created through the public key encryption process.24 Encryption describes the
process of transforming readable text into unintelligible text that cannot be read
or interpreted without first being deciphered.2' The first step in creating a digital
signature requires a computer to generate two mathematically interrelated keys;
26
one key remains private and the other is distributed over the Internet to the
general public.27 Next, the private key holder uses the private key to create a
digital signature by encrypting an electronic messagez into unreadable text.
amount of time the pen is on and off the paper" it is difficult to imitate. Id.
22. See id.
23. See id. (noting that this type of technology gained its name because it is attributed to a person in the
same way an ink signature is); see also Stem, supra note 15, at 395-96 (highlighting the different types of
biometric signatures, and noting that it is not limited to capturing handwritten signatures but may be used to
capture other physical characteristics, such as muscle movements of the eye).
24. See Andrew B. Berman, International Divergence: The "Keys" to Signing on the Digital Line -The
Cross-Border Recognition of Electronic Contracts and Digital Signatures, 28 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
125, 128 (2001). A digital signature has also been defined to mean "[ain encrypted, tamper-proof attestation,
usually attached to an encrypted e-mail message or a certificate, that the person or authority signing the
certificate is confident that the message's originator is actually the person he claims to be." WEBSTER'S, supra
note 2, at 162.
25. See Berman, supra note 24, at 128.
26. A key used in cryptography means "the procedure that is used to encipher the message so that it
appears to be just nonsense." WEBSTER'S, supra note 2, at 306.
27. The public key is derived from the private key. Telephone Interview with Verisign Technical
Support Agent (Mar. 4. 2002). Each time a potential client wishes to contract with a private key owner, a new
public key can be generated from the private key and sent to the potential client. Id. Alternatively, the public
key can be posted on a website, and when a client wishes to contract with the private key holder, the client
enters into another encrypted area analogous to a secure telephone line, called a secure socket layer. Id. The
secure socket layer is the area on the website where a client would enter their personal information, such as
banking information, or it could be a login page. Id. The potential client knows she is in the secure socket layer
when a golden padlock icon appears at the bottom of the active screen. Id. In this area, the private key holder
and public key user are ensured privacy from outsiders because the secured socket layer is a unique line of
communication between the parties. Id. Thus, the secret socket layer's unique line of communication allows the
same public key to be used simultaneously by multiple users on a website, but forbids each public key user from
deciphering communications from other public key users because each user cannot step outside its secure line of
communication. Id.; see also Winn, supra note 14, at 762-63 (noting that this process is called asymmetric
cryptology and called public key cryptography because two different keys are generated, and it lies in contrast
to symmetric encryption (private key) which uses 'single key encryption'); see also Downing & McKean, supra
note 3 (reporting that public key technology was first explained in the 1970s).
28. See Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 14, at 314 (noting that the electronic message is passed
through a hash function that makes a unique "fingerprint" of that message). This hash message is then encrypted
with the private key and attached to a plain text message. Id. The recipient of the message runs the plain text
message through the same hash and compares it to the hash sent from the private key holder. Id. In theory, both
of these should be identical. Id. However, if this message digest has been tampered with, it would generate a
completely different message digest. Id.
29. See Bradford Biddle, Legislating Market Winners: Digital Signature Laws and the Electronic
Commerce Marketplace, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1225, 1228 (1997) (discussing the potential shortcomings of
digital signature legislation based on the public key infrastructure model).
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Only the public key user engaged in the particular transaction can decipher the
message.0 Thus, "digital signatures are not like... [those]... obtained after
signing for a package at UPS."3' Instead, digital signatures are complex
compilations of information made from a sophisticated mathematical formula
that can only be deciphered by the key holders.32
Digital signatures offer three immediate benefits to users on the Internet.
First, a digital signature confirms that the message came from the private key
holder because it can only be properly deciphered into readable text by its
mathematically related public key.33 Second, using digital signature technology
reveals any alteration of the message.34 Third, the private key holder cannot deny




Another commonly used electronic signature is made with symmetric
cryptology, or private key cryptography.36 In contrast to public key cryptography,
from which digital signatures are made, private key cryptology is based on the
shared private key principle.37 The most common type of shared secret key is a
personal identification number (PIN), like those used at an Automatic Teller
Machine.38 In a shared private key system, each party uses the same key to both
encrypt and to decipher a message.39 This type of electronic signature is already
widely used in the electronic financial service network.4 0 However, it is generally
not utilized by parties without previous contact. 1
Delivering a shared secret key over the open network can be problematic and
costly.4 2 For example, sending a PIN via e-mail message is problematic because
30. See id. at 1228 (highlighting the fact that the underlying technology used to create a digital signature
is complex).
31. See Berman, supra note 24, at 131; see also Winn, supra note 14, at 741 (noting that these digitized
versions of a person's handwriting are also used by retail stores in point of sale transactions).
32. See Downing & McKean, supra note 3 (describing how to send information to the private key holder
with its corresponding public key).
33. See Biddle, supra note 29, at 1228 (noting that this quality is called "data origin authentication").
34. See id. (noting that this benefit is called "message integrity"); see also Guideline Tutorial, supra note
10 (affirming that "the digital signature also identifies the signed message, typically with far greater certainty
and precision than paper signatures. Verification reveals any tampering, since the comparison with the hash
result.., shows whether the message is the same as when signed").
35. See Biddle, supra note 29, at 1228 (describing this digital signature attribute to be a "'non-
repudiation" quality); see also Guideline Tutorial, supra note 10 (emphasizing that a "digital signature cannot
be forged, unless the signer loses control of the private key").
36. See Berman, supra note 24, at 129-30 (noting that the most popular standard of private key
encryption is the Data Encryption Standard know as DES).
37. See Winn, supra note 14, at 760 (reporting that private key technology was first explained in 1977
and was used for sensitive, but not classified, information).
38. See Berman, supra note 24, at 126.
39. See id. at 129-30.
40. See Winn, supra note 14, at 762 (noting that in 1981, the American Bankers Association adopted the
Data Encryption Standard).
41. Id. at 763.
42. See Berman, supra note 24, at 126 (discussing aspects of the a private key encryption based on
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third parties can easily intercept the message before it arrives at its final
destination.43 Moreover, physically delivering a secret key is costly, time
consuming and inconvenient, especially when parties must travel to make the
delivery." Additionally, using a shared secret key requires each party to trust one
another to prevent the security of the key from being compromised.45
Unlike private key cryptography, when parties use digital signature
technology they do not have to resort to the elaborate methods for delivery.46 The
public/private key relationship does not require each party to share a secret key to
read and decipher information. Once a key pair is generated, the public key can
be distributed over the open network and it will only decipher messages
generated with the private key.47 The mathematical relationship between both
keys enables the private key holder to post her public key over the Internet,
without ever having to reveal her private key.48
B. Certification Authorities
A certification authority "[fills] the need for trusted third party services in
electronic commerce by issuing digital certificates that attest to some fact about
the subject of the certificate.' '49 In other words, certification authorities verify the
trustworthiness of the public key and help eliminate misrepresentation. For
example, a person with the intent to defraud can distribute a public key and
misrepresent that she is a major business. An unsuspecting customer, believing
this misrepresentation to be true, may contract with this business by using the
corresponding public key. If the customer gives out credit card information or a
bank transfer authorization, he will be at a loss when he does not get the item for
which he bargained. To avoid this, a certification authority certifies the
authenticity of the public key and attributes the key to a person or a business
symmetric encryption).
43. See Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 14, at 308 (noting that this is part of a security risk, inherent
in the open architecture of the Internet).
44. See Berman, supra note 24, at 130.
45. See Winn, supra note 14, at 763 (offering the remedy of a "central key distribution system" to
alleviate the problems associated with the private key distribution).
46. A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce, 75 OR.
L. REv. 49, 51 (1996) (describing, in detail, the actors within the public key infrastructure and focusing on the
role of digital signatures and certification authorities in e-commerce). "Sender and receiver no longer need a
secure way to agree on a shared key." Id.; see also Winn, supra note 14, at 763-64 (highlighting the fact that
exchanging a public key in a face-to-face transaction is still the most secure way of delivering public keys).
47. See Downing & MeKean, supra note 3, at 2 (explaining that the public key holder can verify the
integrity of the message by making a 'hash' of the original text as well to see if the message digest produced is
the same as the one sent).
48. See Berman, supra note 24, at 131 (noting that "most competent implementations of public key
encryption never allow the private key to leave the cryptographic token, thus leaving the private key more
protected").
49. See Froomkin, supra note 46, at 55-64 (discussing the significant role that certification authorities
play within the public key infrastructure).
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entity.5"
Certification authorities typically attest to the private/public key owner's
identity by issuing a digital certificate after verifying that person's identity."
Certification authorities verify the owner of a public key by actually supplying
the key or by simply researching the identification of the key holder. 2 The digital
certificate contains the identity of the certification authority, names or describes
an attribute of the subscriber, contains the subscriber's public key, and contains
the certification authority's digital signature.53 Some certification authorities also
provide verification of its digital signature via certification by a second
certification authority.54 Ultimately, after the certification authority attests to the
ownership of the public key, the potential merchant or customer may feel more
confident about conducting e-commerce because the public key can be placed
with whomever he or she wishes to deal. 55
Electronic signatures and certification authorities can close the gap between
unfamiliar contracting parties, who may be thousands of miles apart. The
relationship between digital signatures and certification authorities builds a
viable model to alleviate verification problems. In an effort to legitimize and
promote the use of electronic signatures, legislatures around the world have
56
created a wealth of legislation supporting their use.
50. See id. at 51.
51. See id. at 55 (noting that a certification authority could either be a public or private entity, and
discussing the role for which the government can build up confidence for business transacting online).
52. See id. at 58-59 (noting that some certification authorities offer a hierarchy of certificates that may
require people to actually present themselves for verification before a certificate is issued).
53. See id. at 57-58.
54. See Berman, supra note 24, at 132 (describing the concept of having a root certification and noting
that some state governments provide the root certification).
55. See Kossick, supra note 3, at 422 (noting that merchants will engage less in e-commerce if they feel
less secure about the "real world identities of the parties with whom they deal"); see also Froomkin, supra note
46, at 56 (noting that certification authorities do not eliminate all problems and two realistic problems exist that
can lead to uncertainty amongst users). First, the certification authority's digital signature on the issued
certificate may not be authentic. See id. Even when another certification authority certifies the first certification
authority's digital signature, questions are still raised regarding the reliability, and the extent to which that
certification authority properly researched the identity behind the public key. See id. As Michael Froomkin
points out, "Certificates-R-Us," a certification authority that makes zero-inquiries may issue a real certificate,
but the value of the attestation would be low. See id. at 58.
56. For a comprehensive view of legislation on electronic signatures across the world see Chris Kuner &
Stewart Baker et al., An Analysis of International Electronic and Digital Signature Implementation and
Initiatives, at http://ilpf.org/groups/analysisIEDSII.htm (last modified Sept. 2000) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer).
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE LEGISLATION
The genesis of electronic signature legislation can be traced to legislative acts
by the United States and the United Nations. 57 The United States addressed legal
uncertainties associated with e-commerce transactions by passing the Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN). Specifically, E-
SIGN validates the use of electronic signatures in the United States, superceding
previous laws that required an ink signature. 9 Internationally, the United Nations
adopted the Model Law on Electronic Commerce (MLEC) after recognizing
both the legislative inadequacies amongst a number of countries and the need for
global uniform legislation on e-commerce. 6' Both acts make e-commerce a more
reliable and uniform way to conduct business.
A. History of Electronic Signature Legislation
In October 2000, the United States enacted legislation to facilitate the
"continued development and improvement of e-commerce and electronic
transactions" throughout the country. 62 However, by that time, many states had
already enacted their own legislation governing e-commerce and electronic
signatures.6s For example, both Utah 4 and California had previously enacted
legislation validating the use of electronic signatures to execute a contract.
57. See Amilia H. Boss, Electronic Commerce and the Symbiotic Relationship Betveen International
and Domestic Law Reformation, 72 TuL. L. REV. 1931, 1955 (1998) (reporting that the United Nations' Model
Law was the earliest attempt to address e-commerce and that the ABA Model Agreement served as a
"foundation" for such a law). The impetus for the Model Law dates back to drafting efforts in 1984. See id. at
1947.
58. See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031(2002);
see generally Robert A. Wittie & Jane K. Winn, Electronic Records and Signatures Under the Federal E-SIGN
Legislation and the UETA, 56 Bus. LAW 293 (2000) (providing an in depth discussion of the Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act).
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a)(2) (establishing that "a contract to [a] transaction may not be denied legal
effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic records was used in its
formation").
60. See UNCITRAL Model Lav on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment, G.A. Res. 51/162,
U.N. GAOR, (1996), available at http://uncitral.org/englisltexts/electcom/ml=ecomm.htm [hereinafter MLEC]
(copy of file with The Transnational Lawyer) (highlighting the goal of better international economic relations).
61. See id. at cmt. 3 (noting that some "existing legislation imposes or implies restrictions on the use of
modem means of communication").
62. Berman, supra note 24, at 144.
63. See Boss, supra note 57, at 1970 (reasoning that state interest in electronic signature legislation was
spawned by "an element of competition to be the center of high-technology commerce").
64. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101-504 (1995). For a discussion on how California's legislation may
be preempted by federal legislation see Emilia Currer, Legislative Counsel of California, Electronic Signatures
and National Commerce Act: County Records: 19087 (2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
65. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16.5 (West Supp. 1995).
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The legislation enacted by Utah and California illustrates two distinct
categories of electronic authentication legislation: one technology-specific6 and
the other technology-neutral. 67 Utah authored technology-specific legislation,
dictating that parties exclusively use a certain type of technology, namely digital
68signatures, when executing a contract. In contrast, California enacted
technology-neutral legislation allowing parties to use a wide range of technology
in electronic transactions.69 The adoption of divergent types of legislation
modeled after Utah and California has influenced legislative efforts in both the
United States and the United Nations.
1. The Utah Digital Signature Act
Utah's efforts to promote e-commerce began with the Utah Digital Signature
Act (The Utah Act) in 1995 .7o The Utah Act has served as precedent for
technology-specific legislation within the United States and in the international
context.7' The Utah Act 2 is unique in form because it sets a legal standard in
which digital signatures may be used and it also defined the role of certification
authorities.73
The Utah Act was the first piece of legislation to incorporate the use of
digital signatures as a means of executing an electronic document. 74The Utah
66. See Wittie & Winn, supra note 58, at 295 (noting technology-specific legislation mandates only a
certain type of electronic signature be used when contracting via electronic means).
67. See Boss, supra note 57, at 1971 (noting that a technology-neutral law is open ended and allows for
different types of electronic authentication).
68. See Kuner et al., supra note 56 (noting that technology-specific legislation is seen as prescriptive and
"allows legislatures and regulatory agencies to play a direct role in setting standards for and influencing the
direction of new technologies"); see also Boss, supra note 57 (recognizing that the Utah Digital Signature Act
may be preempted by the Federal Legislation). Nevertheless, the author of this Comment maintains that a
discussion of the Utah Digital Signature Act is pertinent because this piece of legislation serves as a model for
international technology-specific legislation and offers an alternative form of legislation to that adopted by
Congress.
69. See Kuner et al., supra note 56 (recognizing that this type of legislation is a minimalist approach
aimed at facilitating the electronic signature use in general).
70. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-101 (2001).
71. See Kuner et al., supra note 56.
72. In 2000, Utah enacted a technology-neutral piece of legislation called UETA. See UNIFORM
ELECTRONIC TRANSACTION ACT § 7(d) (1999), available at http://www.lawupenn.edulblllulc/fnact99/
1990s/ueta99.htm [hereinafter UETA] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer); see also Ben Bates,
Recent Legislative Development... Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, UTAH L. REV. Soc'y 935 (2000).
73. See Froomkin, supra note 46, at 50 (highlighting the fact that "Utah was the first state to attempt to
provide a regulatory framework for [certification authorities]"); see also Berman, supra note 24, at 140
(emphasizing that The Utah Act "provides a legal infrastructure in which users employ repositories,
certification authorities, and public key cryptography technology to sign electronic documents in a legally
binding fashion").
74. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-403 (defining the requirements that make a digitally signed document
as "valid, enforceable, and effective as if it had been written on paper"); see also Boss, supra note 57, at 1970
(describing Utah as "the home to high-technology companies" dealing with digital signatures); see also James
A. Johnson, Enacted State Digital Signature Legislation, at http://nii.nist.gov/pubs/enstsign/html (last visited
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Act made a digitally signed document legally equivalent to a written document
when two requirements were met.75 First, the document had to "bear in its
entirety a digital signature."76 Second, a digital signature was required to be
coupled with a digital certificate, issued by a state-licensed certification authority
that verified the owner of the public key.77 Once these requirements were met, a
digital signature was equivalent to an ink signature.78
The Utah Act sought to regulate certification authorities by offering an
incentive of limited liability once certain requirements were met.79 In order to
obtain this safe harbor, certification authorities were required to obtain a license
from the Utah Department of Commerce prior to issuing any authentication
certificates. Each certification authority was also required to post a
guaranteesland to meet certain enumerated personnel requirements.82 For
example, licensed certification authorities could not hire persons convicted of a
"felony or crime involving fraud, false statements, or deception."83  If a
certification authority met these enumerated requirements, it was immune from
liability for any losses created by fraudulent digital signatures. 4 Moreover, any
liabilities certification authorities incurred were limited to the amounts specified
in the digital certificate.
Oct. 21, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (describing various state legislation regarding
digital signatures); see also Berman, supra note 24, at 139 (discussing Utah's status as a pioneer regarding
digital signatures in the United States).
75. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-403.
76. Id. § 46-3-403(1)(a); see also § 46-3-103(10) (defining a digital signature as a transformed message
"using an asymmetric cryptosystem such that a person having the initial message and the signer's public key
can accurately determine whether: (a) the transformation was created using the private key that corresponds to
the signer's public key; and (b) the message has been altered since the transformation was made").
77. See id. § 46-3-403(1)(b)(i)-(ii) (requiring that that the certification authority also have a valid license
"at the time the digital signature was created").
78. See Boss, supra note 57, at 1970 (emphasizing the goal of promoting e-commerce "among parties
previously unknown to each other, and to limit liabilities of parties for errors of identification").
79. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-309(2)(a) (noting that if a certification authority does not waive this
right, they will only be liable for "any loss caused by reliance on a false or forged digital signature").
Furthermore, a certification authority will not incur liability in excess of the amount specified as in its "reliance
limit" when a loss is caused by any factual misrepresentation that should have be confirmed. Id. § 46-3-309
(b)(i). Also, a certification authority will not be liable for punitive damages, expectation damages or damages
resulting from pain and suffering). Id. § 46-3-309(c).
80. See id. § 46-3-201; see also Johnson, supra note 74, at 2 (documenting some of the requirements that
a certification authority must fulfill before given the ability to limit liability). Also, noting that obtaining a
license is not mandatory. See id.
81. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-301(d).
82. See id. § 46-3-201(b)-(c); see also Berman, supra note 24, at 141 (noting that the Utah Act also
defines record keeping responsibilities, as well procedures that certification authorities must follow when
issuing and revoking certificates).
83. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-201(l)(b).
84. See id. § 46-3-309(2)(a).
85. See Berman, supra note 24, at 141 (explaining the burdens and liability protection that a certification
authority will get should it meet the statutory requirements). Certification authorities will be held to a standard
of care similar to that of negligence. Id.
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The Utah Act was the first piece of legislation to give legal effect to digital
86
signatures based on public key cryptography. The primary justification for
enacting technology-specific legislation was that digital signatures were
presumed to provide "greater security" than other forms of electronic
signatures. However, this presumption effectively excluded all other methods of
authentication, which may be reliable, in favor of public key cryptography. 8
Utah is one of several states that enacted technology-specific legislation that
gave legal effect to only digital signatures, to the exclusion of other forms of
electronic signatures. 9 The Utah Act was prototypical because it was designed to
facilitate e-commerce between parties who had no prior relationship. 9°
Furthermore, Utah Act created a legal standard, in which digital signatures could
be substituted for ink signatures, and it defined the standards in which third
parties, such as certification authorities should operate.
2. California's Digital Signature Legislation
California's electronic signature legislation evolved in two stages. First, in
1995, California added Section 16.5 to the Government Code.91 Second, in late
1999, California adopted the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act,92  with
modifications providing for consumer protection.93 Section 16.5 was particularly
influential to the formulation of other bodies of legislation because it was drafted
with technology-neutral language.94
In 1995, California enacted Government Code Section 16.5, entitled "Digital
Signatures. 95 This section only applied to transactions with a government
86. See Wittie & Winn, supra note 58, at 294 (describing the history behind electronic signature
legislation).
87. Id. at 295 (discussing the fact that digital signature integrity could be compromised if the digital
signature software was not "properly incorporated into software applications, operating systems and network").
88. See Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 14, at 337-38 (adding that some critics claim specific
legislation distorts the electronic signature market by "preventing the evolution of the best business practices,
technological innovations, and competitive pricing"); see also MLEC, supra note 60, at cmt. 55 (discussing the
unwillingness of international legislatures to tie a law to a specific state of technological development).
89. See Wittie & Winn, supra note 58, at 296 (highlighting the fact that other states, such as Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico and Washington have followed Utah by enacting similar technology-
specific legislation).
90. See Berman, supra note 24, at 140-41 (noting that this piece of legislation was structured to give
"users confidence [when utilizing] digital signatures as an authentication procedure for [e]-commerce
transactions").
91. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 16.5 (West Supp. 1995).
92. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1633.1-1633.17 (West Supp. 2001).
93. See Witte & Winn, supra note 58, 296; see also Alan C. Raul et al., California Signs Off on
Cybercontracts: Legislature Is First to Adopt Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (Feb. 2000), at http:fl
www.sideley.com/cyberlaw/features/califomia.asp (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
94. See Boss, supra note 57, at 1972-74 (discussing the development of electronic signature legislation
and comparing it to the developments on the international level).
95. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 16.5. It should be noted at this point that California's definition of digital
signature departs from the customary definition of digital signature, which is considered to be the product of
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agency, but nevertheless, gave electronic signatures the same legal effect as ink
signatures, provided certain requirements were met.96 First, the electronic
signature had to be uniquely identifiable to the user.97 Second, the electronic
signature needed to be capable of verification. 98 Third, the electronic signature
had to be "under the sole control of the person using it."99 Fourth, the electronic
signature needed to be attached to the data in a way that would reveal any
changes.' Finally, the electronic signature was required to conform to
regulations adopted by California's Secretary of State.' '
Section 16.5 is considered technology-neutral because it allows parties to use
multiple forms of electronic signatures to authenticate documents. California
defines an electronic signature as "an electronic identifier, created by computer,
intended by the party using it to have the same force and effect as the use of a
manual signature. ' ' r Allowing such a broad definition permits the use of digital
signature alternatives, such as biometric signatures.' 3
The terms of Section 16.5 are deliberately broad because California fears the
"over-regulation of an industry that has yet to fully evolve would only serve to
stifle the natural market forces that are crucial to the thorough evolution of any
emerging technology."'0' California's technology-neutral approach sparked other
states to adopt similar legislation. 5 However, Section 16.5 fails to create legal
certainty among private parties engaging in e-commerce because it applies to
only a narrow class of transactions between the government and private parties.'06
The rapid growth of opportunities in e-commerce incited many state
legislatures to enact legislation regarding electronic signatures. The dilemma
each legislature faced was whether to enact a technology-specific piece of
legislation or a technology-neutral one. This resulted in divergent law regarding
electronic signatures throughout the United States.
asymmetric encryption. See Webster's, supra note 2, at 306; see also Berman, supra note 26, at 128.
96. See California FAQs, supra note 20.
97. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 16.5(a)(1).
98. See id. § 16.5(a)(2).
99. l § 16.5(a)(3).
100. See id. § 16.5(a)(4).
101. See id. § 16.5(a)(5); see also Boss, supra note 57, at 1972 (discussing legislative efforts in Illinois
as echoing the requirements as laid down in California).
102. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16.5(d).
103. See Gaudreau, supra note 17; see also Communications Intelligence Corporation, supra note 19.
104. See California FAQs, supra note 20.
105. See Boss, supra note 57, at 1972 (stating that this type of technology-neutral legislation was "more
popular in the United States than the Utah focus on digital signatures alone").
106. See Johnson, supra note 74.
417
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B. The Need for Uniform Legislation
As U.S. states continued to enact conflicting legislation, interstate commerce
was burdened by the legal uncertainty regarding the status of electronic
signatures.' °7 Furthermore, businesses were forced to meet the technology
requirements of every state in which they dealt'Oa The Clinton administration
noted that a lack of legal certainty dissuaded the public from conducting business
on the Intemet.' °9 With these thoughts in mind, the administration sought
assistance in creating a "uniform legal framework that recognizes, facilitates, and
enforces electronic transactions worldwide.""
1. The Uniform Electronic Transaction Act
Motivated by the lack of uniform state legislation on e-commerce, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)"'
sought to accommodate electronic transactions within contract law."2 The
NCCUSL believed that a uniform e-commerce law would promote interstate
commerce. "3 Thereafter, the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act (UETA) was
proposed to the states. 114 UETA seeks to remove possible legal impediments
regarding electronic signatures, without changing the underlying substantive
contract law."
5
UETA affects the medium in which business is conducted by allowing ink
signatures to be replaced by electronic signatures."6 Under Section 7, an
electronic signature may not be denied legal effect simply because it is in
electronic form."7 UETA defines an electronic signature as any "sound, symbol
or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or
107. See Stern, supra note 15, at 391.
108. See id.
109. Id. supra note 15, at 391 (quoting the Clinton Administration's July 1997 report that encouraged
the private sector to address the public's "wariness of conducting extensive business over the Internet because
of the lack of a predictable legal environment governing transactions").
110. Id.
11l. See INGEO SYSTEMS, DISCUSSION PAPERS, ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT LEGISLATION 1-2 (2001)
[hereinafter DISCUSSION PAPERS] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (describing the NCCUSL to be
"an organization of attorneys, judges, and law professors that drafts proposals for uniform legislation and works
toward their enactment in state legislatures").
112. See Boss, supra note 57, at 1963.
113. See DISCUSSION PAPERS, supra note 11l, at 1.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 2; see also Raul et al., supra note 93 (noting that UETA is more of a procedural guide
than substantive change of the underlying law).
116. See UETA, supra note 72 (providing that "if a law requires a signature, an electronic signature
satisfies the law"). Section 5 does not require parties to the use electronic signatures to make an agreement. Id.
§ 5(a).
117. Id. § 7 (noting that the source of this particular section to be the Model Law on Electronic
Commerce).
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adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record." ' Similar to California's
statute, UETA emphasizes the intent of the parties rather than a single style of
electronic signature." 9  Therefore, UETA maintains a technology-neutral
approach, leaving the parties to determine both the format and the security
measures they wish to utilize. ,0
Although NCCUSL aspired to create uniformity among states through
UETA, this goal was not immediately achieved. For example, California was the
first to adopt UETA's provisions, but created many exceptions to limit UETA's
applicability." Furthermore, California's version of UETA created potential
problems because the applicable laws could differ if the contract was formed
through both electronic and paper means.'2 Thus, California's modifications
thwarted the prospective union of paper and electronic contracts. 12
However, state support for UETA's technology-neutral provisions has
steadily increased. Prior to 2000, twenty-two states enacted a version of UETA,U
and in the wake of federal legislation, forty-three states have followed suit.'21
Among these states is Utah,26 reflecting its change from a technology-specific
118. Id. § 2(8) (noting that the "essential attribute of a signature involves applying a sound, symbol or
process with an intent to do a legally significant act"). Further, this section contemplates parties using a digital
signature based on asymmetric encryption, it only qualifies as a form of electronic signature and is not the only
type that can be used. Id. at § 2, cmt. 7; see also Boss, supra note 57, at 1973 (noting that the drafting
committee initially favored the presumption that a "certified digital signature bound the purported signer to the
electronic record"). However, these presumptions were eliminated by the time the final draft was finished. Id. at
1974.
119. See UETA, supra note 72, § 2, cmt. 7 (requiring an electronic signature to also be logically
associated with the record); see also Patricia Fry, A Preliminary Analysis of Federal and State Electronic
Commerce Law, available at www.uetaonline.condocs/pfry700.html (last modified July 2000) (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting that UETA also address issues relating to attribution, where the typical
issue under this section is not whether the document is electronically signed, but rather "whose signature
appears" on it). UETA allows a party to avoid liability if that party's electronic signature was used when the
evidence shows that this party did not intend to create a legally binding obligation. Id.
120. See DISCUSSION PAPERS, supra note 111, at 2 (noting that each party can chose from any
technology presently available and also from types available in the near future).
121. See Wittie & Winn, supra note 58, at 296 (noting that many of the amendments to the NCCSUL
approved UETA were spawned by the consumer advocates).
122. See Raul et al., supra note 93.
123. See id.
124. See Margot Saunders, The Dynamics of Consumer Protection In Light of UETA and E-SIGN, at
http:www.consumerlaw.orgle commerce/dynamicsof consprotection.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2001) (copy on
file with The Transnational Lawyer) (listing Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah and Virginia as all passing a version of UETA).
125. See Carol A. Kunze, What's Happening to UETA in the States, at http://www.ueatonline.com/
hapstate.html (last modified Apr. 6, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
126. See Ben Bates, Recent Legislative Development... Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, UTAH L.
Rnv. Soc'Y 935 (2000) (discussing various aspects of Utah's version of UETA and noting that "the legislature
did not want to 'burden' people with requiring a digital signature if they did not have one"). Senator Lyle
Hillyard, the sponsor of the Utah's version of UETA, wanted to preserve party autonomy by allowing them to
negotiate what type of electronic signature should be used in their contract. See id. Bates also notes that Utah's
version of UETA does not interfere with the Utah Act. See id.
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legislative posture to the technology-neutral approach encompassed 
in UETA.' 27
Furthermore, California may repeal its version of UETA in order to replace it
with an approved and recommended version of UETA. 28 Although the goal of
uniform law envisioned by the NCCUSL was slowly being achieved, Congress
sought a more timely resolution to the issue of divergent legislation.
2. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce
By mid-2000, less than half of state legislatures had enacted a version of
UETA.'2 9 The probability of nationwide adoption of UETA was of particular
concern to lobbyists from the high technology and financial service industries.'
3
Subsequently, these lobbyists asked UETA be used as a model for federal
legislation.' The Clinton Administration, motivated by the Internet boom,
responded and sought to draft a uniform law because the divergent legislation
was viewed as the "antithesis of strong and efficient markets."'
' 2
In June 2000, President Clinton signed E-SIGN into law.'33 E-SIGN was
designed to create uniformity among states and to facilitate interstate e-
commerce.'4 E-SIGN validates the use of electronic signatures and equalizes
them legally with ink signatures, thereby providing legal certainty to parties
engaged in e-commerce transactions. 135
Under Section 7001 of E-SIGN, "a contract may not be denied legal effect,
validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or record was
used in its formation."' 3 6 E-SIGN defines an electronic signature as "any sound,
symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a contract... and
executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record."'
37 E-SIGN
127. See Kunze, supra note 125.
128. S.B. No. 97 (Ca. 2001), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bilsen/bill/sen/sb-0051-
0100/sb_97_bill 20010509_status.html (introducing a bill that would effectively repeal California's version of
UETA and replace it with the NCCUSL's approved version of UETA and federal legislation).
129. See Saunders, supra note 124 (listing twenty states as having enacted UETA provisions).
130. See Stem, supra note 15, at 399 (noting that E-SIGN proponents were concerned that waiting for
states to enact uniform laws could take as long as enacting other uniforms acts; for example, the UCC took
approximately nine years to be accepted by most states).
131. See Wittie & Winn, supra note 58, at 297
132. Stern, supra note 15, at 391 (noting that in 1997 the Clinton administration urged "the private
sector to respond to the public's 'wariness of conducting extensive business over the Internet because of the
lack of predictable legal environment governing transactions"').
133. See Berman, supra note 24, at 144 (noting that most of E-SIGN's provision took effect in October
of that same year).
134. See Stern, supra note 15, at 399 (noting that conflicting state laws requires companies "to
customize their services to meet the requirements of each state").
135. See id.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a)(2) (2002).
137. Id. § 7006(5); see also UETA, supra note 72, § 2 def. 8 (defining an electronic signature to mean
"an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or
adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record").
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does not specifically mandate that certain types of electronic signatures be used
in an electronic transaction, therefore it is technology-neutral legislation."8 In
effect, an e-mail message, a digital signature, or a biometric signature can be
used to execute a document, as long as it is intended to be substituted for an ink
signature. Furthermore, E-SIGN's technology-neutral provisions ensure party
autonomy by allowing them to choose the type of electronic signature that may
be used when contracting. 39 E-SIGN's definition of electronic signature
promotes e-commerce transactions because parties can use simple and
inexpensive technologies to make binding agreements.
E-SIGN generates uniformity through an unusually worded preemption
clause, which gives deference to state legislatures.' 4 Section 7002 specifies under
what circumstance state legislation will survive E-SIGN's preemption effects. 4'
The preemption provision permits states to partially displace E-SIGN with UETA
or equivalent legislation, which ensures "legal effect" to electronic signatures.142
Should a state choose the latter, it may not give "greater legal status" to a
particular form of electronic signature. 43 Thereafter, technology-specific state
laws, such as The Utah Act are preempted by E-SIGN. 44 Furthermore, modified
versions of UETA, such the California version, are also preempted by E-SIGN
because they effectively exempt large numbers of state laws from UETA's
'45grasp.
138. See Jenny Oh, Signed Sealed, Delivered, The E-Signature Act May Drive Demand For
Authentication Technology, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Sept. 18, 2000, available at http://www.thestandard.
com/article/0,1902,18331,00.html?printer friendly= (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
139. See Wittie & Winn, supra note 58, at 300 (noting that E-SIGN protects the autonomy of the
contracting parties); see also Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-
7031 (highlighting the fact that a consumer need not use electronic contracts). Additionally, E-SIGN protects
consumers from inadvertently entering into electronic contracts by requiring extensive consumer consent before
an electronic contract can substitute a written contract. l § 7001 (c)(1)(A)-(C).
140. See Wittie & Winn, supra note 58, at 324-25 (noting that "[ilnstead of providing, as is more
common, that the Act preempts 'inconsistent' state laws or simply allowing the preemption of inconsistent state
laws to be an implicit result of the supremacy clause of the Constitution, E-SIGN approaches the subject from
the opposite direction").
141. See id. at 325.
142. See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031 (2000).
143. See id. § 7002(a)(2)(A)(i-ii). The Act specifies that:
alternative procedures or requirements for the use or acceptance (or both) of electronic
records or electronic signatures to establish the legal effect, validity, or enforceability of
contracts or other records, if-such alternative procedures or requirements are consistent
with this subchapter and subchapter IH of this chapter; and such alternative procedures or
requirements do not require, or accord greater legal status or effect to, the implementation
or application of a specific type of technology or technical specification for performing
the functions of creating, storing, generating, receiving, communicating, or authenticating
electronic records or electronic signatures.
Id.
144. See Wittie & Winn, supra note 58, at 334 (highlighting Congress' intention "to prevent a state from
giving a leg-up or impos[ing] an additional burden on one technology or technical specification that is not
applicable to all others").
145. See Raul et al., supra note 93 (citing Patricia Brumfield's discussion of §§ 1633.3(b)(4), 16.33.3(c),
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E-SIGN's goal of harmonizing disjointed state electronic signature
legislation is steadily being realized. Congress has not only succeeded in enacting
uniform technology-neutral legislation for interstate and foreign commerce, but it
has also succeeded in prompting states to adopt uniform legislation for statewide
transactions. 6 Having technology-neutral legislation will be beneficial both
within the United States' borders and beyond, especially if international
legislatures attempt to harmonize global trade laws on electronic commerce.
C. Harmonizing International Legislation
The United Nations General Assembly approved the final version of the
Model Law of Electronic Commerce (MLEC) in 1996.147 The MLEC was drafted
by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)1
4
1
to promote the "harmonious economic relations" between nations. 49 The MLEC
is a framework, which does not cover all rules and regulations, but is "intended to
provide essential procedures and principles for facilitating the use of modern
techniques for recording and communicating information in various types of
circumstances."'50 The General Assembly believed a model law could contribute
significantly to the development of harmonious international trade amongst
countries with "different legal, social and economic systems."'5'
Article 7 of the MLEC addresses issues relating to electronic signatures and
authentication.'52 When writing Article 7, the Working Group considered a
1633.3(f), 1633.5(b)-(c), 1633.15 (a)-(b) and 1633.16 from Electronic Signatures: Impressions on California's
Change to the Unifonn Transaction Act, BNA Electronic Commerce & Law Report (Dec. 1999)); see also
Currer, supra note 64 (discussing the preemption effect of E-SIGN on California's version of UETA and
concluding that it will be preempted to the extent it is inconsistent with E-SIGN).
146. See Kunze, supra note 125 (highlighting the fact that some forty-three states have enacted versions
of UETA).
147. See Boss, supra note 57, at 1932 (discussing the initial phases that the United Nations took in
addressing e-commerce).
148. See id. at 1947 (documenting that in 1984, UNCITRAL submitted a report to the Secretary General
on the legal aspects of automatic processing). Shortly thereinafter UNCITRAL recommended that governments
review the legal affects of electronic commerce. See id. This recommendation was endorsed by the General
Assembly. See id. By 1986, UNCITRAL was working in the area of electronic funds transfer. See id. Noting
that the UNCITRAL Working Group on International Payments began their work in 1987 was completed in
1992; thereafter its name was changed to the "Working Group on Electronic Data Interchange." Id. at 1948-52.
149. MLEC, supra note 60, at pmbl.; see also Boss, supra note 57, at 1953 (explaining that "the Model
Law is intended to provide essential procedure and principles for facilitating the use of modem technique... in
various types of circumstances").
150. Boss, supra note 57, at 1954.
151. MLEC, supra note 60, at pmbl.
152. See Boss, supra note 57, at 1969 (discussing the effect of Article 7 which left open a lot of
judgment of the parties involved in e-commerce); see also MLEC, supra note 60, art. 7. The MLEC states in
pertinent part:
[Wihere the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met in relation to a
data message if: a method is used to identify that person and to indicate that person's
approval of the information contained in the data message; and that method is as reliable
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signature's function 53 and accounted for procedures, such as stamping, which
have the same binding effect as ink signatures.'MsArticle 7 aims to give an
electronic signature the same legal effect as an ink signature even if "it was not
authenticated in a manner peculiar to paper documents. '55
Article 7 allows an electronic signature to substitute for its ink counterpart
under two conditions. First, the signer must be identifiable and there must be
indicia that the signer approved the record.156 Second, the method used to identify
the signer must be appropriately reliable.57 The requirements of Article 7 are
deliberately broad in order to avoid the "risks of tying the legal framework of the
[MLEC] to a given state of technological development."'58 Hence, Article 7 has a
technology-neutral posture.
UNCITRAL expanded Article 7 of the MLEC by drafting a supplement to
it.'59 The Working Group on UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures
(MLES)'60 specifically seeks to provide further guidance on the reliability
requirement of Article 7 (1)(b) of the MLEC.' 6' In formulating this section, the
Working Group accounted for government participation in e-commerce
transactions.' 62
as was appropriate for the purpose for which the data message was generated or
communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, including any relevant agreement.
Id.
153. See MLEC, supra note 60, at cmt. 53 (noting signatures were used: "to identify a person; to provide
certainty as to the personal involvement of that person in the act of signing; to associate that person with the
content of a document").
154. See id. at cmt. 54 (noting that in some jurisdictions, "contracts for the sale of goods" above a
specified value must be signed to be enforceable). However, a perforation or a typed written signature or
letterhead may fulfill the requirement for a signature. See id.
155. See id. at cmt. 56 (noting that Article 7 provides "the general conditions under which data messages
would be regarded as authenticated with sufficient credibility and would be enforceable in the face of signature
requirements which currently presents barriers to electronic commerce").
156. See id. at art. 7
157. See id. at cmt. 58 (listing some factors that will assist the fact finder in identifying a signer). Factors
taken into account are the "sophistication of the equipment used by each of the parties ... compliance with
trade customs and practice." Id.
158. See id. at cmt. 55 (explaining the intent behind drafting Article 7).
159. See UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, UNCITRAL, 34th Sess. Annex I (2001),
available at http://www.unictral.orglen-index.htm [hereinafter MLES] (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (noting that the MLES was adopted on July 5th, 2001); see also Draft Guide to Enactment of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signature, U.N. GAOR, UNCITRAL, 34th Sess., at cmt. 71, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/493 (2001), available at http://www.uncitral.orglen-index.htm [hereinafter Draft Guide] (copy on file
with The Transnational Lavyer) (noting that the MLES serves as a supplement to the MLEC and "is intended to
provide essential principles of facilitating the use of electronic signatures"). The "main features of the [MLES]
is to add certainty to the operation of the flexible standard set forth in Article 7 of the [MLEC]." Id.
160. See Draft Guide, supra note 159, at cmt. 3 (relaying a concern that divergent legislation on
electronic signatures can create uncertainty); see also Kuner et al., supra note 56 (documenting the status of
digital and electronic signature legislation in the European Union, North America, South America and Asia).
161. The language in Article 7(l)(b) is virtually identical to that of the Article 6(1) of the MLES.
162. See MLES, supra note 159, at art. 6(3). The MLES provides:
[Ain electronic signature is considered to be reliable for the purpose of satisfying the
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Article 7 of the MLES suggests how to interpret a state's active participation
in electronic authentication. '63 Under this article, a government agency or state-
recognized private entity may choose to use specific types of electronic
signatures and act as a certification authority for that electronic signature.' 64 If a
government prefers a particular electronic signature, then the electronic signature
should automatically meet the reliability requirements of both MLEC's Article 7
and Article 6 of the MLES. 16' However, Article 7 of the MLES is not intended to
exclude other types of technologies that meet the reliability requirements of the
MLEC and the MLES, but it is meant to offer predictability in defining these
requirements. '66
Like the MLEC, the MLES maintains a technology-neutral approach 67 while
also "adopting an approach under which the legal effectiveness of a given
electronic signature technique may be predetermined."' 6 However, the MLES,
unlike the MLEC, was specifically drafted with the public key infrastructure in
mind.' 69 Thus, the MLES defines the duties and the standards of care for the
signatories 7 ° and the certification authorities. 7 '
The Working Groups from both the MLEC and MLES were cognizant of the
global implementation of electronic signature legislation. The Working Group on
the MLEC was influenced by entities from within the United States, such as the
American Bar Association, "2 the NCCUSL, and the drafters of The Utah Act.'
7 1
required to in paragraph (1) if: (a) the signature creation data are, within the content in
which they are used, linked to the signatory and to no other person; (b) the signature
creation data were, at the time of signing, under the control of the signatory and of no
other person; (c) any alteration to the electronic signature, made after the time of signing,
is detectable; and (d) where a purpose of the legal requirement for a signature is to
provide assurances as to the integrity of the information to which it relates, any alteration
made to that information after the time of signing is detectable.
Id.
163. See MLES, supra note 159, at art. 7(1) (stating "[any person, organ or authority, whether public or
private specified by the enacting State as competent may determine which electronic signatures satisfy the
provisions of Article 6 [of MLES]").
164. See Draft Guide, supra note 159, at cmt. 132.
165. See id. at cmt. 133; see also MLES, supra note 159, at art. 6 (noting that this section also requires
that the government chosen standard be in accordance with reliable international standards).
166. See Draft Guide, supra note 159, at cmt. 133.
167. See id. at cmt. 5.
168. Id. at cmt. 4.
169. See id. at cmt. 133.
170. See MLES, supra note 159, at art. 8(l)(a) (requiring the signatory to "exercise reasonable care to
avoid unauthorized use of its signature creation data").
171. See id. at art. 9(l)(b) (mandating a certification authority to "exercise reasonable care to ensure the
accuracy and completeness of all material representations made by it that are relevant to the certificate
throughout its life-cycle, or which are included in the certificate").
172. See Boss, supra note 57, at 1970-71 (noting also that language in the MLEC refers to the ABA
Digital Signature Guidelines).
173. See id. at 1970-73; see also Berman, supra note 24, at 138-54 (discussing the legislative efforts by
the United States, Germany and the European Union).
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Both the MLEC and the MLES maintain a technology-neutral stance'74 and lie in
contrast to legislation that mandates the use of certain technologies."
Nevertheless, UNCITRAL has not ignored the impact of technology-specific
legislation. The Working Group on the MLES seeks to define standards in which
specific technologies can be utilized, while maintaining a technology-neutral
approach to using electronic signatures in e-commerce.
IV. CHINA'S E-COMMERCE LEGISLATION
E-commerce, known as Dianzi Shangwu in Chinese, is an emerging sector of
China's economy. 176 In 1999, Chinese businesses conducted $24.1 million in e-
commerce sales; this figure is expected to reach $3.3 billion by 2004.' China's
entry into the World Trade Organization will undoubtedly help it meet these
forecasts.78 However, China faces two immediate problems relating to its
participation in e-commerce. First, China's national contract laws may be unable
to accommodate this evolving sector of the economy because their laws do not
specifically address the enforceability of electronic signatures. Second, China
may not have the necessary technological infrastructure to support an expansion
into the e-commerce market.
79
The enforceability of electronic signatures in China remains uncertain
because it is not explicitly addressed in China's contract law. However,
significant developments regarding electronic signatures have emerged from
within the financial sector reand from within the Chinese provincial regions.'8'
These developments provide a de facto standard that will likely serve as a
foundation for future national law on electronic signatures.
174. See Boss, supra note 57, at 1971 (reporting the MLEC's technology-neutral stance which sought
legislation that worked with whatever technology the market might produce).
175. Id.
176. See JOHN WONG & NAH SOEK LING, CHINA'S EMERGING NEW ECONOMY, THE INTERNET AND E-
COMMERCE 55 (2001) (discussing the growing economy as of January 2002).
177. See id. at 55-56.
178. See id. at 86; see also McKenzie, supra note 8 (noting that China's admission to the WTO should
promote further e-commerce because there will be less restrictions on domestic and foreign companies to
conduct business in China).
179. See People's Daily Online, China Seeks Ways to Push E-Commerce, at http://english.people
daily.com.cn/200001/19/print20000l19X122.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2001) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (reporting that Beijing hosted a forum on e-commerce to address issues relating to the
development of infrastructure and laws relating to the Internet).
180. See Wang, supra note 9, at 21.
181. See WONG& LING, supra note 176, at 139-42.
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A. Contract Law in the People's Republic of China
In 1999, China undertook measures to facilitate e-commerce by adopting the
Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (PRC Contract Law). s2 Before
enacting this body of law, China strongly favored traditional paper contracts.'
83
Although the PRC Contract Law applies to general contract issues, such as offers
and acceptance, it has roots in the MLEC.'
The PRC Contract Law permits parties to use digital technology to create
enforceable agreements. Under Article 10, contracts can be made in forms other
than written agreements.'85 Under Article 11, e-mail messages can satisfy the
writing requirement because it is a physical representation of the terms of the
contract.186 However, Article 32 requires each party to "sign or affix their seal on
it."'"" Herein lies the problem, as it is unclear whether an electronic signature
fulfills the requirements of Article 32.188
Since the PRC Contract Law does not expressly address electronic
signatures, contracting parties may not be able to enforce agreements executed
with an electronic signature.' 9 Furthermore, it is uncertain as to how, or if, an
electronic signature may be admitted as evidence of a person's signature because
it does not readily fit into any of the seven categories of admissible evidence in
China.'9 For example, if an electronic signature is classified as "audio-visual
material," it cannot stand as independent evidence and must be supported by
182. See McKenzie, supra note 8.
183. See id. (noting that this law replaced PRC Contract Laws that were drafted in the 1980s).
184. See Stephen Nelson & Nancy Leigh, E-Com Legal Guide- China, at http://www.bakerinfo.com/
apec/chinaapec-main.htm (last modified Jan. 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (discussing
similar provisions for determining when a contract was formed through the use of a data messages); see also
Wang, supra note 9, at II (explaining the procedure behind when an offers or acceptance sent electronically
would become effect); see also Volker Pastemak, China Could Be the Next Frontier for E-Conmerce, But
Inestors Need Creativity and Good Nerves, 20 No. 12 E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP. 9 (1998) (noting that China
looked to used definitions consistent with MLEC provisions relating to electronic date interchange).
185. See Nelson & Leigh, supra note 184 (noting that written requirement is supplied through the
exchange of data messages).
186. See Wang, supra note 9, at 11 (discussing, in general, the rules for electronic contract formation);
see also McKenzie supra note 8 (eluding to permitted forms of electronically generated data that could be
enforced under the PRC Contract Law).
187. Nelson & Leigh, supra note 184.
188. See Wang, supra note 9, at 12; see also Pasternak, supra note 184 (discussing the fact that
provisions dealing with authentication, like those in MLEC, were not incorporated in the PRC Contract Law);
see also Thinkquest, Destiny, the Culture of China-Chop Engraving (Apr. 4, 2002), at http://library/
thinkquest.org/200443/g-chop-engraving.html (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (describing the
Chop, an object analogous to the seal, to be a traditional Chinese requirement for authenticating a person's
identity).
189. See Nelson & Leigh, supra note 184 (stating that it is unclear "whether a digital signature created
by asymmetric public key encryption will be recognized as the legal signature of a party because China has yet
to establish a public key infrastructure to facilitate the public key encryption technology").
190. See Wang, supra note 9, at 20 n.86 (listing the other forms of admissible evidence to be
"documentary evidence, material evidence, testimony of a witness, statements of a party, expert opinions, and
records of inspection").
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other forms of circumstantial evidence. 9' In contrast, if an electronic signature is
submitted as documentary evidence, it must be an original.' 92 However, in an
electronic transaction the contract sent to the addressee is always a copy."'
Chinese scholars argue that an electronic signature is admissible under either
approach, as long as the data is capable of being authenticated. 94
Although the PRC Contract Law addresses some issues relating to electronic
documents, it does not expound on the legal effect of electronic signatures. The
uncertainty inherent with a lack of national electronic signature legislation
spawned the financial sector and provisional hubs to create their own standards.
B. The China Financial Certification Authority
The Chinese financial sector recognized the significance of e-commerce on
its economy and created the China Financial Certification Authority (CFCA).
The CFCA is a joint venture between twelve banks,' 95 including the People's
Bank of China, and serves as the root certificate authority between: banks,
B2B,' 96 and B2C'97 transactions. 198 The CFCA "provides security services for
China's entire financial sector... [and] is becoming the security driver for
China's e-commerce infrastructure."'" Part of the CFCA's responsibility is
verifying a customer's public key, thereby authenticating the customer's identity
for potential clients.2 Furthermore, this organization plans to validate
approximately $1 billion worth of transactions by issuing over 100,000 digital
certificates.20' The CFCA anticipates these digital certificates will boost consumer
191. See id. at 20 (recognizing that "Chinese scholars are divided in classifying electronic messages as
'documentary evidence' or 'audio visual evidence"').
192. See id.
193. MLEC, supra note 60, at cmt. 62.
194. See Wang, supra note 9, at 20.
195. Press Release, Entrust, People's Bank of China (PBOC), The China Financial Certification
Authority (CA) Project 2, 5 (Feb. 16, 2000) [hereinafter The CFCA Project] (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (listing the other participating banks to be the Agriculture Bank, Industrial and
Commercial Bank, Construction Bank, Communication Bank, Merchant Bank, CITIC Bank, Guandong
Development Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, Everbright Bank, Hua Xia Bank and Ming Sheng Bank).
196. The acronym B2B is used to describe transactions between businesses. Marketing terms.com, B2B,
at http://www.marketingterms.com/dictionary/b2b (last visited Feb. 11, 2002) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer).
197. The acronym B2C is used to describe transactions between businesses and consumers.
Marketingterms.com, B2C, at http://www.marketingterms.com/dictionary/b2c (last visited Feb. 11, 2002) (copy
on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
198. See Stephanie Sim, China Steps Up Online Banking Security, at wyswyg://IDGNET_
MAIN.46/http:www.secur.. .asdt%3Di%26as_sitesearch%3D%26safe%3Doff (last modified Sept. 3, 2001)
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (reporting on the CFCA's goals of providing consumers with
more confidence when conducting business online).
199. Id.
200. See The CFCA Project, supra note 195, at 6 (describing the benefits that consumers and business
will have in this venture).
201. See Entrust, China Financial Certification Authority Tout Successful Launch of Secure Online
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confidence in business conducted over the Internet.02 This project "is the largest
e-commerce infrastructure project ever undertaken in the country" and has the
central government's support.
3
The CFCA is a beneficial institution because it provides a measure of
certainty for customers who use its technology. However, the CFCA limits the
type of technology parties may use to those based on public key encryption.2'
Subscribing to only one type of technology makes this a technology-specific
standard. This standard has also been applied in provisional regions of China.
C. The Shanghai Electronic Certification Authority Center
Shanghai has taken significant steps to facilitate e-commerce and has created
an infrastructure for authenticating a person's identity. On April 4, 2000, the
Provisional Methods of Shanghai Municipality on the Price Management of E-
Commerce (Provisional Methods) were drafted.20'5 The Provisional Methods seek
to manage digital certificates and to create standardized pricing for the
authentication of digital certificates.2 6 Under Article 4, the Shanghai Electronic
Certificate Authority Center Co., Ltd. (Certificate Authority Center) is the only
207institution authorized to verify and authenticate a person's identity, create
digital certificates and manage the use of digital certificates. 28 Further, the
Certificate Authority Center issues the software necessary to create digital
signatures. 2 9 However, the Certificate Authority Center may entrust other
companies to issue digital certificates.10
Shanghai's Provisional Methods are noteworthy for several reasons. First, the
Provisional Methods were the first piece of legislation in Mainland China to
Banking Project, at http://www.entrust.cm/news/files/08 30_0l759.htm (last updated Aug. 30, 2001) (noting
that the CFCA's new plan followed a pilot program which issued 15,000 digital certificates); see also Sim,
supra note 198 (reporting that some CFCA officials heralded this move as "the largest effort ever undertaken to
promote e-commerce in China").
202. See Sim, supra note 198.
203. The CFCA Project, supra note 195, at 7.
204. See E-mail from Carrie Bendzsa, Public Relations Manager, Entrust, Inc. to Ian Rambarran (Nov.
12, 2001, 7:37:50 PST) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting that "[tihe digital certificates will
be verifying information generated by our public-key infrastructure").
205. ChinaOnline, China's New Rules on E-Commerce Digital Certificates (Apr. 14, 2001), at
http://www.chinaonlince.com/reer/legal/currentnews/secure/c00040471.asp [hereinafter New Rules] (copy on
file with The Transnational Lawyer).
206. See id. at art. 1.
207. See id. at art. 4 (authorizing "[tihe CA Center [to] entrust related units with the acceptance and
issuing of digital certificates").
208. See id. at art. 5 (defining the parameters of service to include: "[olpening new accounts: Services
include customer identity verification, digital certificate creation, certification storage, certificate management,
certificate inquiry, regular certificate maintenance, certificate installment and guidance for use").
209. See id. at art. 5(6).
210. See id. at art. 4.
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incorporate public key cryptography into law.-1 Second, the Provisional Methods
established a central role for a public body to act as a certification authority.
212
Third, the Provisional Methods are technology-specific because their service is
based on public key cryptography. 23 However, the Provisional Methods fall short
because they only imply official recognition of digital certificates, which in turn,
could lead parties back to the unclear guidance of the PRC Contract Law to settle
any disputes.2 4 In contrast to Shanghai's Provisional Methods, Hong Kong has
enacted extensive legislation addressing electronic signatures and e-commerce.
D. Hong Kong's E-Commerce Initiatives
Hong Kong has recognized the need to promote e-commerce and has tried to
facilitate its growth by enacting legislation addressing the use of electronic
signatures. In January 2000, Hong Kong implemented the Electronic Transaction
Ordinance (ETO) to "facilitate the use of electronic commerce transactions for
commercial and other purposes. ' '215 Hong Kong also enacted the Code of Practice
for Recognized Certification Authorities (Code of Practice), which specifically
defines the role of registered certification authorities.2 6 These pieces of
legislation, together, provide an enforcement mechanism for digital signatures.
The ETO allows ink signatures to be replaced by electronic signatures.
2'7
Specifically, the ETO mandates contracting parties use digital signatures.,8
However, the digital signature must be coupled with a digital certificate issued by
a recognized certification authority.219 Since the ETO mandates the use of only
211. See WONG & LING, supra note 176, at 88-97 (charting the significant the e-commerce
developments in China).
212. See New Rules, supra note 205.
213. See id.
214. See Wang, supra note 9, at 20 (highlighting the absence of a "particular provision in the Provisional
Methods stating the legal status of digital certificates, [but] they do imply ... official recognition").
215. See Information Technology, Electronic Transaction Ordinance, at http:llwww.info.gov.hklitbb/
english/new/etcontent.htm (last updated May 5, 2000) [hereinafter ETO] (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer).
216. See Information Services Technology Department, Code of Practice for Recognized Certification
Authorities, available at http:llwww.itsd.gov.hk/itsd/carolCop-pdf/cop.pdf (last modified Jan. 2000) [hereinafter
Code of Practice] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that the concept for these
procedures was "first articulated in the American Bar Association Digital Signature Guidelines").
217. See ETO, supra note 215, at art. 6(1) (stating that "[i]f a rule of law requires the signature of a
person for certain consequences if a document is not signed by a person, a digital signature of the person
satisfies the requirement but only if the digital signature is supported by a recognized certificate and is
generated within the validity of that certificate").
218. See id.
219. See id.; see also People's Dally Online, HK to Launch Scheme to Promote E-commerce, at http://
english.peopledaly.com.cn/20001/30eng2000120Xl01.html (last updated Jan. 30,2001) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (reporting that Hong Kong is also trying to encourage its authentication infrastructure by
allowing for a "voluntary certification authority"). This means that certification authorities are not required to
apply for government recognition in order to provide verification services. See id. This move reflects the fact
that Hong Kong government appreciates the role that the private sector could have in providing authentication
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digital signatures and digital certificates, it is technology-specific legislation. 220
The ETO requires the Director of the Information Technology Service
Department (ITSD)22' to give official recognition to certification authorities.
222
Subsequently, the ITSD Director officially recognized the Hongkong Post 2 as a
trustworthy certification authority and charged it with the responsibility of
issuing digital certificates to identify public key owners.224 The duties of
recognized certification authorities are described in detail in both the ETO2 and
its supplement, the Code of Practice.226 Should a certification authority meet the
enumerated requirements expressed in the ETO and in the Code of Practice, it
will "not be liable for any loss caused by reliance on a false or forged digital
signature. ''221 Moreover, a recognized certification authority will not be liable for
damages "in excess of the amount specified in the certificate as its reliance
limit.' '28 Recognizing the Hongkong Post as a certification authority appears to
services, and also indicates its stance away from over-regulation in this area. See id.
220. See ETO, supra note 215, at art. 2. Digital signature is defined by the ETO as follows:
An electronic of the signer generated by the transformation of the electronic record using
an asymmetric cryptosystem and a has function such that a person having the initial
untransformed electronic record and the signer's public key can determine: (a) whether
the transformation was generated using the private key that corresponds to the signer's
public key; and (b) whether initial electronic record has been altered since the
transformation was generated.
Id.
221. See Information Technology Services Department, Welcome, at http://www.itsd.gov.hklitsd/
about/ewelcome.htm (last updated July 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (reporting that the
ITSD is geared to promote information technology in Hong Kong).
222. See ETO, supra note 215, at pmbl. (stating that the ETO was meant "to enable the Postmaster
General to provide the services of a certificate authority and to provide for connected purposes").
223. See Hongkong Post, Welcome Message, at http://www.hongkongpost.com (last visited Feb. 24,
2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting that the Hongkong Post is a public entity that
serves mail to the Hong Kong region.).
224. See Government Creates Secure Environment for E-business, at http://itsd/press/epr01 1204.htm
(last updated Dec. 2001) (noting that the Hongkong Post is the first recognized certification authority, but in
mid-2001 the ITSD recognized another certification authority); see also People's Daily Online, HK Government
Geared Up to Promote E-commerce, at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200001/251eng20000125XlOl .html
(lasted updated Jan. 25, 2000) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (reporting that the Hongkong Post
will use "public key cryptography and digital certificates" to identify parties, verify the information integrity
and to ensure that electronic transactions could not be repudiated).
225. See ETO, supra note 215, at art. 37 (mandating "[a] recognized certification authority [to] use a
trustworthy system in performing its services-(a) to issue or withdraw a recognized certificate; or (b) to
publish in a repository or give notice of the issue of withdrawal of a recognized certificate"); see also Code of
Practice, supra note 216, art. 4 (requiring certification authorities to "set out the procedures used by it... to
authenticate a subscribers prior to the issuance of certificates" and "[describe] procedures for each class, type or
description of certificates" issued by that recognized certification authority).
226. See Code of Practice, supra note 216, art. 1(1) (noting that the ITSD Director was authorized to
make these provisions under ETO art. 33).
227. ETO, supra note 215, at art. 42(1).
228. Id. at art. 42(2) (specifying that this safe harbor provision could be waived by the certification
authority).
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be part of a strategy aimed at developing a public certification authority. 9
In contrast to Mainland China, Hong Kong has extensive legislation
regarding electronic signatures. The ETO mirrors prior legislative acts once
favored in the United States. For example, the ETO provides explicit duties for
certification authorities, similar to those in The Utah Act.20 In addition, the ETO
is technology-specific, only allowing a digital signature coupled with a digital
certificate to be as enforceable as an ink signature 21 Like The Utah Act, the ETO
does not explicitly authorize any other forms of technology that could be used for
authentication. The ETO's technology-specific posture contrasts with E-SIGN
and MLEC, as these regulations have technology-neutral language.
Although China's national contract law addresses some issues relating to e-
commerce transactions, it falls short of addressing electronic signatures.
Nevertheless, interest in electronic signatures has not been ignored. The CFCA,
the Provisional Methods, and the ETO have created an infrastructure within
which digital signature technology can be used. Furthermore, the government
officials in both Shanghai and Hong Kong are trying to elaborate their existing
infrastructure by creating a cross-certification system to allow these regions to
accept digital certificates from each other. 2 2 However, the benefits provided are
limited to transactions either executed within those regions or within the banking
industry.
V. THE FUTURE OF CHINESE E-COMMERCE LEGISLATION
Chinese initiatives in the financial sector and within the provisional areas
reveal several themes that will likely influence any future legislation addressing
electronic signatures. However, these underlying themes may be contrary to laws
similar to E-SIGN and MLEC. Nevertheless, the Chinese legislature should
consider the examples set by both E-SIGN and MLEC so that the strengths and
weaknesses of each can be compared to those of technology-specific legislation,
such as The Utah Act.
229. See China Daily Information, Digital Signature Framework to Boost E-commerce, at http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/cover IstorydbI2000IO913Olit-cnidigital.html (last modified Sept. 30, 2000) (copy on file with
The Transnational Lawyer) (reporting that the first step is to provide the "legal framework for the development
of a public key infrastructure ... The second prong is the establishment of a public certification authority, and
the third is for the government to adopt a public key infrastructure").
230. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 46-3-201,46-3-301(d), 46-3-309(2)(a) (2001).
231. See id. § 46-3-403; see also Berman, supra note 24, at 139.
232. See Hongkong Post e-Cert, Cooperation Arrangement between HK Post and Shanghai Electronic
Certification Authority, at http:llwww.info.gov.hkgia/general/200105/24/0523310.htm (last updated May 24,
2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (reporting that this arrangement will ultimately explore
"the development of a Chinese Certification Authority System for Hongkong Post").
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A. Underlying Themes in China's E-commerce Legislation
There are two themes tying the CFCA, the Provisional Methods, and the
ETO together. First, the government or an official body plays a central role in
issuing digital certificates. Second, each subscribes to a technology-specific
approach and has a bias towards public key cryptography. However, a new trend
may be emerging that contrasts with these commonalities.
The CFCA, the Provisional Methods and the ETO each call for a central
governmental role in electronic transactions. The Provisional Methods, for
example, authorizes the Certificate Authority Center to be the only entity in
Shanghai permitted to issue digital certificates and provide authentication
services. 233 Likewise, the ETO requires a digital signature to be accompanied by a
digital certificate issued by a state recognized certification authority.3 The
central control theme exists for two reasons. First, the Chinese government
mistrusts the use of encryption because they fear parties might use it to
circumvent the government's ideology or compromise its national security
interests.235 Second, China wants to ensure that consumers deal with trustworthy
certification authorities so that they are not dissuaded from participating in the e-
commerce marketplace.36
The second underlying theme between the CFCA, the Provisional Methods
and the ETO is their subscription to public key cryptography. The CFCA and
Shanghai's Certificate Authority Center have both based their authenticationt237
services on digital certificates made with public key cryptography .
Furthermore, the ETO also requires parties to use both digital signatures and
digital certificates based on public key cryptography. 23 Thus, the CFCA and the
233. See New Rules, supra note 205, art. 4.
234. See Angus Forsyth & Yvonne Chia, How Contract Law Applies to Cyberspace and the Pitfalls
Posed byv the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, at http://www.hk-lawyer.com/200-6/JuneO)0-79.htm (last
visited Feb. 16, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting that digital certificates issued by
unrecognized certification authorities are unenforceable under the ETO).
235. See John Eichelberger & Annabel Allen, A Legal Perspective: The Impact of the WTO on Foreign
Investment in China's Internet/E-Commerce Sector, at http://www.perkinscoie.com/resource/intldocs/to
impact.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (highlighting the Chinese
government's concern that the Internet could be used to disseminate state secrets); see also Wang, supra note 9,
at 19 (reporting that in October 1999, China required "all foreign and domestic firms or individuals using
encryption technology to register with the government"). However, this mandate was eventually modified
because U.S. trade lobbyists moved the Chinese State Encryption Administration Commission to exclude
application of this law to wireless telephones and Windows applications. See id.
236. See Information Technology Service Department, Government Creates Secure Environment for E-
Business, at http://www.itsd.gov.hk/itsd/press/epr011204.htm (last modified Apr. 12, 2001) (copy on file with
The Transnational Lawyer) (quoting Mr. Alan Wong, Director of Information Technology Services Department
(ITSD) who said "[w]ithout trust, the community will not have the necessary confidence that makes transactions
on-line possible"). Also, Mr. Wong noted that the ITSD is seeking to identify vulnerable parts of their
information infrastructure so they may be protected from cyber attacks. See id.
237. See The CFCA Project, supra note 195, at 6-7.
238. See ETO, supra note 215, at art. 6(1).
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legislative acts in both Shanghai and Hong Kong adhere to a technology-specific
approach to electronic authentication.
On the other hand, there is evidence suggesting that a future Chinese law on
electronic signatures may contain technology-neutral language. For example, the
Chinese have based parts of their PRC Contract Law on segments of the United
Nations' MLEC.' 9 Moreover, Chinese scholars have declared that Chinese e-
commerce law should conform to the general provisions of the United Nations.m
Finally, recent ventures between public entities have moved away from using
only digital signatures and have adopted the use of other electronic signatures,
such as those based on biometric technology. 4'
China's underlying themes of government participation and preferences for
public key cryptography are well established. However, being mindful of
developments occurring outside its borders offers alternatives to the Chinese
status quo, and should be a factor when considering what style of legislation
works best in China.
B. Trying to Find the Legislative Mold that Fits in China
China is essentially faced with three types of electronic signature legislation.
First, is the technology-specific style of legislation modeled after The Utah Act.
Second, is the purely technology-neutral example set by E-SIGN. Third, is the
technology-neutral approach with adaptations for government participation, as
exemplified by both MLEC and MLES. When molding a law that best caters to
China's needs, the Chinese legislatures should test each of the aforementioned
examples with the underlying themes mentioned above.
Should Chinese legislatures follow examples of technology-specific
legislation, like The Utah Act, it might be able to readily fulfill its goals. First,
technology-specific legislation offers the Chinese government a measure of
central control by mandating parties to use a specific technology. Furthermore,
the central control theme can also be maintained by requiring a state body to
issue digital certificates or have a private business do the same, as long as they
meet the Chinese security requirements. 2 In addition, the Chinese government's
participation in e-commerce should build the public's confidence because state
bodies offer a measure of security.23 Finally, having a technology-specific body
of national legislation will build on the infrastructure already in place within
239. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
240. See Pinxin, supra note 11.
241. See UVentures, Nanjing Civic Bureau Signs Licensing Agreement with Cic China for Electronic
Signatures (May 14, 2001), available at http://www.uventure.com/servlets/UVTechNews/2590 (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting that the trend amongst Chinese organizations to employ the most
current advances in electronic signature technology).
242. See id. (noting that "[tihe Chinese government's general policies toward the interet and e-
commerce are a blend of encouragement and control).
243. See Sim, supra note 198.
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China. Thus, any Chinese legislative action similar to The Utah Act should
readily satisfy the underlying themes previously discussed.
If China enacts technology-neutral legislation similar to E-SIGN, it will be
unable to preserve the two themes of central control and technology-specific
legislation. For example, a Chinese law mandating that digital signatures be used
would immediately clash with E-SIGN because it forbids giving greater legal
status to electronic signatures.2 " Also, requiring parties to use government issued
digital certificates as a prerequisite to enforcing a digital signature, would collide
with E-SIGN because it prohibits the preferential treatment of electronic
signatures.245 The alternative is to allow parties to use any electronic signature
and use the services from any certification authority. This predicament is the
opposite result to the central control theme exemplified above. Furthermore,
excluding the Chinese government from participating as a certification authority
could reduce the public's confidence when contracting online. 6
If China enacts technology-neutral electronic signature legislation similar to
MLEC and MLES, it could still maintain the themes mentioned above. The
MLEC and MLES are technology-neutral, and both essentially allow any
electronic signature to be used instead of an ink signature. However, the
electronic signature must both identify the contracting party, and be made
through a "reliable" method. 7 To fulfill the reliable method requirement, MLES
contemplates a country appointing a public entity to determine which electronic
signatures are reliable.24 To maintain a measure of central control, China may
create a public certification authority, like the Shanghai's Certificate Authority
Center, and give it the ability to automatically deem digital signatures as reliable.
Further, the public certification authority can offer verification services.
Thereafter, the consumer confidence goal is also maintained because public
certification authorities will be available to consumers and businesses. Under
MLEC and MLES, other types of electronic signatures are not per se
unenforceable; rather, the burden of proof is higher because parties must show
the particular electronic signature used is reliable.29 Thus, a Chinese law
following the approach suggested by the United Nations could be both
technology-neutral and maintain the two themes of central control and a
preference for specific technologies.
Technology-specific legislation may readily fit China's immediate needs,
more so than technology-neutral models of legislation. Although legislation like
244. See 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(2)(A) (2002); see also id. § 7006(d) (allowing any form of electronic
signature to replace an ink signature as long as the party's intent is clear); see also UETA, supra note 72, art. 2
def. 8 (interpreting the term electronic signature to mean "an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or
logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record").
245. See § 7002 (a)(A)(2)(A).
246. See Sim, supra note 198.
247. MLEC, supra note 60, art. 7.
248. See MLES, supra note 159, art. 8.
249. See Draft Guide, supra note 159, at cmt. 133.
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E-SIGN departs from the established practices already in place within China,
legislation like the MLEC and MLES could incorporate China's immediate
needs. However, subscribing to either the model exemplified by the United States
or the model enunciated by the United Nations would require the government to
have a "hands off' approach to electronic authentication. Nonetheless, the
benefits of technology-neutral legislation should not be ignored.
C. Factors and Suggestions for Formulating Electronic Signature Legislation in
China
When formulating electronic signature legislation, China should consider the
development of legislative acts promulgated outside its borders. Moreover, China
ought to consider the underlying policies that led to the development of
technology-specific and technology-neutral acts. By looking to other legislative
initiatives, China can identify the benefits and the weaknesses of each and mold
any future national legislation accordingly. Subsequently, China may find the
approach taken by MLEC and MLES could serve its interests best.
Considering the development of electronic signature legislation and noting
the policies behind those laws will inevitably assist China when formulate its
own legislation. First, China must consider what type of legislation will promote
e-commerce transactions. Second, China needs to contemplate whether the
presumed security benefits of any technology-specific legislation will continue to
exist after new technologies develop. Third, Chinese legislatures must note that
higher transaction costs could be imposed on consumers because parties must
purchase software, hardware and verification services of third parties to meet the
demands of technology-specific legislation. Fourth, the Chinese have to consider
whether or not preserving party-autonomy could be beneficial to an emerging
economy. Fifth, China needs to consider whether the incentives to develop new
technologies will be reduced in the electronic authentication industry by
mandating the use of certain technologies. Finally, the Chinese legislature must
discuss whether mandating technology-specific legislation would overly burden
it to act and create new legislation when old technologies become obsolete and
new measures become necessary.
China should adopt legislation to facilitate e-commerce, but the legislation
should also be flexible enough to accommodate developing technologies. By
assimilating a law with a technology-neutral posture, China will promote e-
commerce because parties can use various types of electronic signatures. If the
Chinese adopt a technology-neutral law it should facilitate more e-commerce
than a technology-specific law because parties have a greater incentive to
participate in e-commerce when they need not purchase peripheral services for
low valued transactions. Although the security benefits of a technology-neutral
law may be lower on average than the alternative, parties could still secure their
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transactions by choosing more reliable forms of authentication when necessary.250
Also, a technology-specific law could prove to be problematic for China in the
future because any mandated technology may become obsolete and insecure as
new technologies develop. This could result in the Chinese government
sponsoring unreliable technologies that may injure the public's confidence when
conducting business over the Internet. Alternatively, the Chinese legislature will
have to reformulate legislation after new technological developments and this
situation could prove impractical. Thus, it seems that the benefits associated with
technology-specific legislation are outweighed by the benefits of technology-
neutral legislation.
China should adopt a technology-neutral law because it allows the greatest
flexibility for parties and promotes the use and development of electronic
signatures. A law similar to the suggestions from the United Nations could prove
to be better suited for the Chinese, than a law modeled after E-SIGN, because
both the MLEC and MLES have a more accommodating approach to government
participation in e-commerce transactions. If China enacts technology-specific
legislation, like The Utah Act, which mandated the use of only digital signatures,
it will be discordant with countries that have incorporated versions of the MLEC
and the MLES into their law and also be inconsistent with its most valued trading
partner, the United States. 25
V. CONCLUSION
There are two significant facts relating to China as of January 2002. First,
China has not enacted national e-commerce legislation legalizing the use of
electronic signatures in contracts. Second, China has been admitted to the World
Trade Organization. Combined, these will impact China's position in the global
e-commerce market. To take advantage of e-commerce and to create legal
certainty, China needs to implement a scheme of national legislation explicitly
recognizing the use of electronic signatures. Although the trend in China is tilted
towards technology-specific legislation, there are signs that China may
implement technology-neutral legislation.
Nevertheless, without explicit direction regarding electronic signatures, the
ease in which they can be used to execute transactions across thousands of miles
will not be successfully utilized.
250. See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the security risks associated with e-mails when
compared to digital signatures or biometric signatures).
251. See People's Daily Online, supra note 9 and accompanying text. See also Kuner et al., supra note
56 (noting that Japan also has a technology-neutral legislation).
